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 —  Es say  — 
The Original Plain Meaning  
of the Right to Bear Arms 
Peter D. Junger †  
The Second Amendment is the fly in the ointment—if not the 
trout in the milk—of constitutional interpretation. The accepted 
stratagem of constitutional scholars is to pretend that it is not 
there—or, at most, to pass it off in a footnote. But even in a footnote 
the constitutional protection of the right “to keep and bear arms” is 
an embarrassment; consider Tribe’s claim in a footnote—the footnote 
that contains the only reference to the Second Amendment in his 
brilliant treatise—that  
[t]he congressional debates . . . indicate that the sole concern of 
the second amendment’s framers was to prevent such federal 
interferences with the state militia as would permit the 
establishment of a standing national army and the consequent 
destruction of local autonomy.1  
Totally ignoring it is equally embarrassing for, no matter how much 
we wish it would go away, it is there. It is almost enough to make one 
wish that the Constitution had remained unwritten. 
 
† Editor’s Note: Peter Junger was an esteemed professor of law at Case 
Western Reserve School of Law from 1970 until 2001. See Cindy Cohn 
& Lee Tien, Peter Junger, Digital Freedom Fighter, 58 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 315 (2008) (“Peter Junger is best known on the internet as the 
plaintiff in Junger v. Daley, a successful challenge to U.S. export 
regulations that had hampered the development of strong encryption 
technology.”). Professor Junger was a frequent contributor to this law 
review, but this essay was unpublished at the time of his death in 2006. 
Peter D. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon 
Papers, 23 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 3 (1971); Peter D. Junger, A Recipe 
for Bad Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 3 (1976); Peter D. Junger, You Can’t Patent 
Software: Patenting Software Is Wrong, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 333 
(2007). Since then, the Supreme Court handed down its interpretation 
of the meaning of the right to bear arms in Heller and McDonald, 
breathing new life into Second Amendment jurisprudence. District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). We felt it important to now publish Professor 
Junger’s theory on the meaning of the right to bear arms. Editorial 
additions to the unpublished manuscript are enclosed in braces. 
1. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 226 n.6 (1978). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
The Original Plain Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms 
142 
Only the Humpty Dumpty—sic volo, sic jubeo—school of 
constitutional analysis appears capable of dealing with it.2 The mem-
bers of the plain meaning school, which is not to be confused with the 
“ordinary language” school of philosophy, are likely to be embarrassed 
by its words: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed.”3 Either this language does not have a plain meaning 
or it plainly forbids laws, at least federal laws,4 outlawing the posses-
sion of arms, at least those arms, such as swords, rifles, and pistols, 
that existed when the Constitution was adopted.5 The conclusion, 
however, that the Second Amendment forbids gun control laws is 
politically unacceptable to either the “conservatives” who believe that 
the government can constitutionally do whatever it wants (except 
violate the “Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment), or the 
“liberals” who believe in the First Amendment, equal opportunity, 
and gun control laws. The plain meaning of the Second Amendment—
if there is one—is palatable only to libertarians who find the plain 
meaning of other parts of the Constitution, such as the Sixteenth 
Amendment, anathema. 
 
2. For an outstanding example of what this school can do to a 
constitutional provision, peruse Richard Epstein’s analysis of the 
“Takings Clause.” Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private 
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985). 
3. U.S. Const. amend. II. 
4. Subscribers to plain meaning analysis may somehow try to limit the 
restrictions of this amendment to laws passed by Congress, citing cases 
like Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), and ignoring the 
fact that the words “Congress shall pass no law” appear only in the 
First Amendment, but Justice Black, the most consistent advocate of 
plain meaning, took the position that, somehow or other, the Bill of 
Rights was incorporated—despite a remarkable absence of any language 
which could support such an interpretation—into the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution. {Since this Essay was unavailable at the 
time, the Court held in Heller that the Second Amendment guaranteed 
the right to possess working firearms, including handguns, in one’s home 
for the purpose of self-defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008); see Jonathan L. Entin, Peter Junger: Scholar and Stylist, 58 
Case. W. Res. L. Rev. 319, 324 (2008) (“If only the Supreme Court 
had access to this analysis amid the torrent of briefs in its recent gun-
control case, District of Columbia v. Heller.”). And, although the Court 
never adopted Justice Black’s “total incorporation” theory, it held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated that right. McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033–34, 3050 (2010).}. 
5. Cf. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475 (1874) {(“The call ‘to arms,’ was a call 
to put on the habiliments of battle, and I greatly doubt if in any good 
author of those days, a use of the word arms when applied to a people, 
can be found, which includes pocket-pistols, dirks, sword-canes, 
toothpicks, Bowie-knives, and a host of other relics of past barbarism, or 
inventions of modern savagery of like character.”)}. 
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Those who advocate interpreting the Constitution in accordance 
with the original intent of the framers are no better off. The original 
intent is ambiguous: either the framers intended to outlaw standing 
armies as Tribe suggests,6 or they intended to outlaw gun control 
laws, neither conclusion being palatable to the liberal-conservative 
consensus, though true libertarians—i.e., anarchists—might embrace 
both horns of the dilemma. The only other conclusion that can be 
reached is the Second Amendment was intended to be a nullity, which 
reveals the framers in a rather farcical light. 
Other schools of constitutional interpretation may have less 
difficulty with the constitutional right to bear arms, but only to the 
extent that they emulate Humpty Dumpty. Those who believe in 
“ordered liberty”7 must surely be embarrassed that such a disorderly, 
uncivilized liberty as the right to bear arms is enshrined within our 
Bill of Rights. Those who believe that their principles are the princi-
ples that must govern constitutional and other legal decisions8 can 
hardly be comfortable with the Second Amendment, unless, of course, 
their principles are opposed to gun control. 
It thus appears that only anarchists, nihilists,9 and solipsists can 
be comfortable with the right to bear arms. Clearly something has 
gone wrong with constitutional analysis. 
It is easy enough to spot the mistake. When philosophers 
abandoned metaphysics, metaphysics found a new home in the law 
schools and in the courts and brought with it all its old baggage of 
paradox and irrelevancy. Once this is recognized, it is easy, in the 
abstract, to see what we must do to save the Constitution from its 
interpreters. The task of legal academics must be to dissolve, rather 
than resolve, problems of constitutional interpretation, just as 
philosophers since Wittgenstein have learned to dissolve metaphysical 
 
6. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
7. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) 
(referring to rights that are “the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty” as the test for incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the 
states). 
8. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading 
of the American Constitution (1996). 
9. Nihilists are sometimes called Crits and vice versa. See Paul D. 
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984); 
{Peter W. Martin et al., “Of Law and the River,” and of Nihilism and 
Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1 (1985)}. Crits do not get 
tenure at Harvard and believe that the law is nothing but a game 
played by the powerful against the poor. Crits are probably the only 
competent doctrinal analysts left in the world; they use their analytical 
skills to prove that the law is inconsistent and incoherent. Crits are 
gentlemen—except when they are ladies: they do not write about the 
Second Amendment or shoot fish in a barrel. 
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problems. The key to such a dissolution lies in the recognition of the 
fact that there need be, and can be, no single correct way of analyzing 
constitutional issues. What is needed is simply the pragmatic 
recognition that different problems must be analyzed in different 
ways.10 
In this Essay I shall demonstrate how it is possible to get rid of the 
embarrassment of the Second Amendment and thus restore that much 
abused provision to its rightful position among our fundamental 
liberties. Only those who still dream of the one true mode of constitu-
tional interpretation will be dissatisfied by my demonstration, for it 
turns on the creation of a new mode of analysis—which I call “original 
plain meaning”—that has never been tried before and which almost 
certainly cannot be applied to any other provision of the Constitution. 
We have seen that neither “original intent” nor “plain meaning” 
can remove the embarrassment of the right to bear arms. The obvious 
solution—or, rather dissolution—lies in the discovery of another intent 
than those which the historical sources indicate motivated the framers 
or another meaning than the one we see so plainly in their words. 
As it turns out, this can be done. Clearly the intent of the 
framers is to be found in the plain meaning of their words in 1789 
when Congress adopted the Bill of Rights11 and proposed them for 
ratification by the states. But what did the “right to bear arms” 
mean in 1789? The obvious answer is given by the 1955 judgment of 
the Court of Chivalry in Manchester Corp. v. Manchester Palace of 
Varieties, Ltd.12 It turns out that the “right to bear arms” is the 
same as the right to display armorial bearings,13 and that the  
10. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). 
11. 1 Stat. 97 (1789). 
12. Manchester Corp. v. Manchester Palace of Varieties, Ltd., [1955] 1 All 
E.R. 387 (Ct. Chivalry) (Lord Goddard C.J.). 
13. {The Court of Chivalry outlined the practice of bearing arms in its 
overview of the court’s history and jurisidiction, noting that the court 
has probably existed since the Conquest. . . . In origin, no 
doubt, the court was essentially a military tribunal, the 
forerunner of courts martial . . . . As the origin of armorial 
bearings was . . . a method of identifying knights clothed in 
armour, it was natural that disputes with regard to the right to 
display a particular achievement on a shield should have fallen 
within the cognisance of this court. . . . The right to bear arms 
is, in my opinion, to be regarded as a dignity and not as 
property within the true sense of that term. . . .} It was not 
contended before me that armorial bearings were an incorporeal 
hereditament, and in any case it is clear that the right to bear 
arms is not a matter cognisable by the common law which seems 
to show that there is no property in arms in the legal sense, 
otherwise the courts of law would protect them. 
Id. at 392. 
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original plain meaning of the Second Amendment is that the 
government shall not infringe upon one’s right to be a lady or a 
gentleman. That the Second Amendment so skillfully avoids the use 
of sexist language suggests that, rather than a barbarous 
anachronism, it is one of the most principled provisions of the pre-
Civil War Constitution. And once we understand this original plain 
meaning, the intent of the framers is revealed: since a well regulated 
militia requires officers, and officers must be gentlemen,14 the 
framers intended to preserve the gentry from the leveling tendencies 
of the masses.15 
Of course, stated so boldly this original plain meaning may seem 
improbable. A careful analysis of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights will, however, do much to dispel such doubts. If it seems 
remarkable that the original plain meaning of the 1789 words of the 
American Constitution should be discovered only in an English case 
decided in 1955, it should be noted that the earlier decisions of the 
Court of Chivalry (the most recent before Manchester was decided in 
1737) were not reported, but that its jurisdiction was recognized by 
Coke and Blackstone and other authorities familiar to the framers. 
 
 
14. The Uniform Code of Military Justice still requires officers to be 
gentlemen, or at least to act that way. {See 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006) 
(“Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of 
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct.”).} 
15. The French revolution broke out in 1789, and there was the long 
English radical tradition of Piers Plowman and Jack Cade. The analysis 
proposed here, though not technically economic, the right to bear arms 
not being property (see supra note 13), is clearly consistent with Beard’s 
Economic History of the Constitution. Charles A. Beard, An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States (1913). 
  
  
 
   
